Previous advertising intensity models have failed to address adequately the rivalry effects of leading firms trying to protect and enhance the market shares of their brands. We argue that the relative degree of market share parity among leading firms in oligopolies is a crucial determinant of market advertising levels. This study presents a model that more thoroughly characterizes market structure by including the variance in the market shares of the top four firms along with the concentration ratio. This model is then tested using a unique 1987 data set of 58 well-defined U.S. food and tobacco manufacturing markets that used private data vendors for branded product market shares and media advertising aimed at household consumers. We find that industry advertising-to-sales ratios are highest in those industries with the highest price-cost margins, highest concentration, and those with equally-sized leading firms. Oligopolists seem unable to control advertising expenses as concentration increases and they likely overinvest in advertising rivalry when they have similar market shares.
While Industrial Organization economists have appreciated the importance of nonprice rivalry since the 1950s, the empirical literature regarding the relationship between advertising intensity and market concentration is not overwhelmingly convincing. Although much of the empirical work finds a positive relationship between industry advertising intensity and concentration, the relationship often shows the maximum effect coming from low-grade oligopolies -those with fourfirm concentration ratios under 50. Dorfman and Steiner (1954) , first linked the advertising-to-sales ratio (A/S) with market structure. They demonstrated that under simple neoclassical assumptions, a monopoly's optimal advertising-to-sales ratio must equal the ratio of its advertising elasticity of demand to the price elasticity of demand for its product.
The subsequent elaboration of this model to cover oligopolistic competitors (e.g., * The authors thank Drs. Julie A. Caswell and Cleve E. Willis for helpful comments, as well as those of the Editor, Dr. William G. Shepherd. Cable, 1972) is even more telling.1 Following Waterson for an oligopolist i occurs where the A/ S satisfies the = (PC Mi) ' (r¡aq ~f* Vrq ' Var)'* where PC Mi is firm z's price-cost margin, r]ar is a con the effect of firm z's advertising on that of rival's, r advertising on firm ťs own demand, and rirq is the ef firm ť s demand. Adequate estimates of these elasticitie if not impossible, given data limitations. What one sh however, is that optimal advertising intensity is deter the price-cost margin and several elasticities that refl competing firms. Although non-price rivalry is embed extension neglects the role of market structure, name (1984, p. 131 ) further extends the model to demonstra intensity does not monotonically decline with an incr Waterson (1984, p. 133) states, "Those who argue for those who argue for a negative relationship between i can both be right over some range of values".
Markets do not advertise equally, either absolutely o some industries requires substantial investments in a other industries requires hardly any media advertising ology in previous research has been to model econom of advertising intensity, advertising expenditures re cross-sectional data. Several factors have been identifi try's advertising intensity and thus explain the inter-i Albion (1981) found that profit margins, market size purchase, product durability, number of brands, and ferentiability" were consistently related to industry a glaring omission is the absence of any measure of ind concentration has been included nearly universally an nant in many studies. Buxton, Davies and Lyons review and found conflicting evidence in the relationship bet but their empirical results found support for a non-line positive as concentration rises from very low levels b at only medium levels of concentration and then the r at higher levels of concentration. We believe that previous research has failed to captu structure that affects non-price rivalry. Although we ag ture -with differentiated products, and selling to h 1 Waterson (1984, Chapter 7) provides an excellent summary of its several extensions. most conducive to advertising rivalry, we contend that the distribution o power among an industry's leading firms is an important element of mark ture but it is masked by the concentration ratio, the most commonly use of concentration. The use of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index lessens this concern but does not eliminate it. We argue that the variance of the leading firms' market shares is a useful complement to the four-firm concentration ratio in predicting which industries will use advertising most intensively.
The inclusion of the leading firms' market shares will help define the preeminent strategic group, be it one dominant firm or several equally sized competitors.
Holding concentration constant, an oligopoly that consists of equally sized rivals is more likely to overinvest in advertising rivalry than an oligopoly that has a dominant leading firm. A common criticism of the single equation advertising intensity model is the potential endogeneity of profitability and concentration. If profitability or concentration is endogenously determined with advertising intensity, ordinary least squares estimates of the model parameters would be biased. Previous researchers have estimated advertising intensity within systems of simultaneous equations (e.g., Comanor and Wilson, 1974; Greer, 1971; Martin, 1979; Pagoulatos and Sorenson, 1983; Kardasz and Stollery, 1984; Zellner, 1989) , though the issue of simultaneity remains unresolved (Buxton et al., 1984) . For the purposes of introducing a new variable into the literature, we argue that the single equation approach is acceptable and offer evidence based on Hausman tests for independence of the regressors that suggest that our estimates do not suffer from simultaneity bias.
I. Model Specification and Data
We specify a model that closely resembles previous research, but includes a measure of the inequality in market shares among a market's leading four firms. The model explains variability in market advertising-to-sales ratios with price-cost margins, market concentration, the standard deviation of the leading four firms' market shares, and three control variables (market size, market growth, and the proportion of sales to final consumers) as given in the following equation:
A/S = ß0 + Bi PCM + &CR4 + &CR42 + ß4 Std Dev + /35VOS + ß6 Growth + ß,CD/S + u.
We then estimate the model using both Census data at th level2 and data from private vendors for 58 processed fo for the year 1987. into the Census SIC system and then aggregated to match the Census pr definitions (see Rogers and Tokle, 1995, for details) . Census value of s comprise the denominator; though they have been criticized for includ food processors, food service operators, and foreign countries because nations attract little or no domestic media advertising (Connor and Weime 10). We prefer instead to use the Census shipments and control for non sales directly in the regression.
Price-Cost Margin
The price-cost margin is the most obvious regressor to include in the regression it is the core of the Dorfman-Steiner model and its extensions. The profit marg represents the reward for increased sales: the higher it is, the more incentive a fir has to advertise in attempting to generate additional sales. Thus, the price-cos margin should positively influence advertising intensity, though causality concer could obscure this relationship.
Many studies have employed price-cost margins derived from Census data. However, Pagoulatos and Sorenson, among others, have suggested that any cor relation existing between Census price-cost margins and advertising intensity spurious because their calculation fails to net out advertising. That is, advertisin exists simultaneously on both sides of the equation. While this problem is easi corrected, Census derived price-cost margins also rely on the quality of the Cens data's approximation of marginal costs, which is often a concern (see Scherer an Ross, 1990, p. 418) .
We avoid such problems associated with using Census price-cost ma taking advantage of our study's focus on food industries which sell bot brands (e.g., Kellogg's Corn Flakes) and the retailer's private label the branded product (e.g., Safeway's Corn Flakes). We used data fr Area Marketing Information (SAMI) and Informational Resources Inco (IRI) to obtain brand sales and private label sales at the retail level. Th ignore non-consumer channels of distribution and hence focus on sale consumers through typical supermarkets. Following Connor and Peter we use the average private label price to approximate marginal cost. They competition among private label manufacturers ensures a price closely marginal cost, since major entry barriers into this strategic group are we define the price-cost margin (PCM) as the relative difference betwe branded price and average private label price at the market level. We measure will proxy the rewards for successful advertising at least as Census measure, but without the problems.
Concentration
Some measure of concentration has been nearly universally employed in ad tising intensity models as a dimension of industry structure although its ef on advertising are far less certain than those of profit margins. The four-firm centration ratio (CR4), as reported in the Census of Manufacturing, is the commonly used measure of concentration, but the Herfindahl-Hirschman (HI) has been used also (e.g., Cable, 1972) .
Most studies have anticipated and found that advertising intensity, in gen increases with concentration, at least over some range of concentration. T little doubt that an increase in concentration reduces the incentive of leading marketing differentiated products to compete with prices, which inevitably a greater reliance on advertising and, thus, a positive advertising-concentr relationship, but there is no reason to expect this relationship to be linear. studies have added a quadratic concentration term to allow for a non-linear re ship between concentration and advertising intensity. The quadratic adver concentration hypothesis is founded on the notion that recognized interdepe increases with concentration and after some level of concentration is reached, will cut back on their advertising expenditures. Thus, an inverted-U shape re ship is expected. However, we believe that a single measure of concentration to capture fully the relative degree of market dominance and hence contam the relationship (the HI less so because it is weighted to the largest firms).
We use the CR4 as our market concentration measure because of its wider in previous studies and our interest in directly measuring size variations amo leading firms. We also estimate the model using the HI for comparison. Althoug conventional inverted-U shape hypothesis is believable, it depends on conje about oligopolistic interaction. If this inverted-U relationship is found, we e that the point of maximum advertising intensity will occu of concentration than found in most previous studies -at of 46 to 53 percent (Scherer and Ross, 1990, p. 598) .4
Market Share Dispersion
The degree of market share dispersion is a critical element of market structure should influence advertising intensities, once market concentration is held con
Since symmetric leading firms in an oligopoly are more likely to recognize collective interest in avoiding price competition, they are more likely to over in advertising as they seek a competitive advantage and collectively raise e barriers into their strategic group -sellers of national brands.
To capture this effect, we will use the standard deviation of the leading f firms' market shares in branded product sales to measure the size similarity leading four firms within the strategic group where advertising rivalry is attr
The larger it is, the more unequal are the market shares of the leading four Particularly large values reflect the presence of a dominant firm. Small va indicate the leading firms are essentially equal in size.
We expect market share dispersion to have a negative effect on advertis intensity. Holding market concentration constant, the presence of asymmet market shares yields better opportunities to reduce advertising expenditures the optimal level than a more symmetric distribution of leading firms. A extreme, an oligopoly with one dominant firm should be able to hold advert intensity close to the optimum level, whereas a more equal distribution shou to overinvestment in advertising rivalry, once concentration is held constant
The variance (and hence standard deviation) of the four leading firms' ma shares in the jth industry, aj, is related to both the truncated four-firm Herfin Index (HI4) and the four-firm concentration ratio (CR4) as follows:5 a) = 0.25 HMj -0.0625 CR4^.
Since the variance is a linear function of the four-firm Herfindahl Index and a squared function of the four-firm concentration ratio collinearity may pose a problem.6 This relationship also suggests that perhaps the HI may have been more appropriate than four-firm concentration ratios in previous studies because of its better ability to account for a dominant firm market structure. We prefer to use two measures to capture more fully the market's structure -the concentration ratio for 4 It seems unlikely that leading firms will recognize their interdependence sufficiently to reduce advertising budgets in unison at a concentration level considered workably competitive to loosely oligopolistic.
5 The algebra is available upon request, or in Willis (1992) .
The simple correlation between the four-firm Herfindahl Index and the Herfindahl Index is 0.85 for the sample used. measuring the degree of oligopoly and the standard deviation of the leading f firms' market shares to measure size similarity among the leaders.
We also estimate the model using a simple alternative to the standard deviat of the four leading firms' market shares. The alternative, which should also acc for market share dispersion among the market leaders, is the ratio of market sha of the two largest firms in an industry. This alternative is easier to calculate will still detect dominant firms and provide a measure of market asymmetry.
The Census does not reveal individual firm market shares and hence we used alternative private vendor data (SAMI and IR I) that provide market data for food industries on sales for household consumption. In each market we calculated the individual market share of retail sales of each of the four leading firms, along with an aggregated share of total sales accounted for by private label products.
Control Variables
The previous literature has demonstrated the importance of an array of con variables and hence we included three commonly used variables: market market growth, and the percent of market sales that are made to final consum Market size, measured by Census value of shipments (VOS), is included becau advertising expenditures are often thought to rise less than proportionally to size of the market, perhaps because of economies of scale in advertising. Far and Albion (1981, p. 23) stated: "There seems to be little question that adverti intensity is lower, ceteris paribus , in large markets than in small markets".
Market growth, measured by percentage change in VOS from 1982 to 1987, included to capture the effects of market dynamism. A growing market is tho to encourage advertising for two reasons. Typically, the rate of new product in ductions is greater and thus periods of initial heavy advertising are more freq It is also likely that advertising is more successful since additional sales nee necessarily be at a rival's expense.
We included final consumer purchases as a proportion of total industry s (CP/S) because professional buyers are unlikely to be persuaded by consumer oriented media advertising. Thus, markets where the buyers are more likely be professional, such as intermediate goods markets, should be less intensiv advertised, ceteris paribus.1 Furthermore, promotional techniques vary betw consumer and producer buyers. For example, sales representatives are more ap priate when selling to a few purchasers (Buxton et al., 1984) . The numerator, was total sales to household consumers as reported by SAMI or IRI, whereas denominator was Census product class VOS. Since these two sources mea food sales at two different vertical stages of the food system, the ratio exceed theoretical upper bound of one in a few cases. However, no superior measure 1982, 1987. available that would allow us to control Willis, 1992 , for further details).
Data
The data assembled for this study represent a major contribution to empirical research. This study took great care to match observations with well-defined eco nomic markets The blending of private vendor data on market shares and med advertising along with more commonly used Census data allows a novel opportunity to test the advertising intensity-concentration relationship. Although suc blending is possible in food industries because of the private data providers, such industries are also well-suited to cross-sectional research on advertising issues. Th food manufacturing sector outspends every other manufacturing sector in adver tising expenditures and the industries within the sector contain a wide variety o market structures -from workable competition to shared monopolies.
We were able to compile information on the advertising-to-sales ratio and the six independent variables at the 5-digit SIC product class level (or occasionally a the 4-digit level if the product class level was too narrowly defined) for 58 food and tobacco manufacturing markets.8 Observations range from canned soup to cheese and chewing gum to refrigerated yogurt. Rich variation is evident in the sample, evidenced by the descriptive statistics in Table I . Advertising intensity varied fro 0.04% (flour) to 18.05% (chewing gum), with a mean A/S of 2.7%.
The independent variables exhibit considerable variation as well. For instance CR4 ranged from 22 to 97, with a mean of 60.8. The average market, thus, border
The derived price-cost margin varies from 0.135 to 0.747, with a m Exceptional variation exists in the standard deviation of the leadin market shares. It ranges from 1.88 for the nonchocolate candy mar leading four firms controlled 12. 1, 9.8, 9.4, and 6 .8 percent of the r market, respectively, to 33.64 for the canned soup industry, where t firms controlled 81.1, 8.3, 1.8, and 1.0 percent, respectively.
n. Empirical Results
The least squares estimates of the parameters for the model are sho Because the disturbances are likely to be heteroscedastic, we used ance estimator to compute the standard errors.10 In column 1, th variables of our primary model explain nearly 41 percent of the v advertising-to-sales ratio for this sample. In columns 2 and 3, two v main model are reported. The original work (Willis, 1992) included variants with varying measures used for the price-cost margin (e.g., concentration, and the degree of market share equality among the lead results proved robust to these variants and the three versions report the main findings of the complete study. Although statistically insig estimated coefficients for the control variables of market size, mark consumer purchases as a percent of total sales, hint at their respect effects.
The estimated coefficient of the price-cost margin based on the relative difference of national brand and private label average prices, PCM, was positive as expected. Although this is the first use of this measure of PCM in an advertising intensity study, the result agrees with the bulk of previous theoretical and empirical findings that the profit contribution of additional sales positively influences advertising, a potential means of increasing sales. Moreover, the magnitude of the coefficient is generally consistent with previous empirical findings (Brush, 1976; Farris and Buzzell, 1979) .
As with many previous studies, the four-firm concentration ratio was a positive determinant of advertising intensity. Although a linear specification yields a positive, significant result, we find that the best specification was quadratic. However, unlike nearly all other empirical studies, we find that the relationship curves upward forming a lazy J-shape as opposed to an inverted U-shape. Our minimum effect occurs at 41 percent as opposed to previous maxima which occurred between 46
to 53 percent and we never reach a maximum effect over the theoretical range of CR4. We speculate that other studies have been contaminated with observations that were over-aggregated by including observations with too many unrelated and noncompeting products. Over-aggregation would bias true market concentration downward and might cause the relationship to reach a maximum at unlikely low levels of concentration. For example, SIC 2844 Toilet Preparations, is commonly used in cross-sectional studies. It is an intense user of media advertising, spending over $1 billion in 1982 -the largest amount of any single U.S. industry (Rogers and Tokle, 1995) . The A/S was 1 1.0%, while the CR4 was only 30, a reflection of combining noncompeting products. This industry contains a wide variety of nonco products with nearly all heavy users of consumer-oriented media adverti industry includes five 5-digit product classes with CR4s ranging from a l the largest product class SIC 28445 -other cosmetics and toilet preparat a high of 74 for SIC 28444 -dentifrices, including mouthwashes, dental f denture cleaners. Even the five-digit product classes for this industry ar broad -including such well-defined economic markets as: lubricating cre tan lotions, sunscreens, lipsticks, mascara and eye shadow, underarm deo fingernail polishes, talcum powder, baby wipes, bubble baths, and depilat name some prominent ones. The implications for estimating an A/5-CR tionship is clear -the expected positive relationship is lost due to poorl economic markets. Although the theory is correct to imply that at some lev centration over-investment in advertising will be checked, intuition shoul that such levels of concentration are unlikely to generate sufficient interde to sustain joint industry advertising reductions. We encourage the re-esti previous studies that included the 4-digit "toilet preparations" industry in t which involves most every previous study (e.g., Buxton et al., 1984) .
The parameter estimate for the standard deviation of the leading four market shares, STD DEV, was negative as expected and statistically sign This provides confidence that it is an important complement to concentr It suggests that when the standard deviation increases by one percenta the advertising-to-sales ratio decreases by nearly two-tenths of a percent This estimated coefficient may seem small, but evaluated at the mean s deviation of nearly 12 percentage points, advertising intensity is decre about 2 percentage points. This is quite an important effect given that advertising-to-sales ratio is only 2.67 percent.
As an alternative measure of market share dispersion, we used the ra market shares of the two largest firms, MS 12. The similarity of results (se 2) suggests this simple measure can adequately capture the asymmetry th non-price rivalry. To appreciate this result, one need only consider the "Cola Wars", where Coke and Pepsi compete heavily with massive spend media advertising aimed at final consumers.
We also estimated the model with the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, regressor in place of the concentration ratio and the results are reported in of Concerns about the exogeneity of concentration and price-cost marg model of advertising intensity have not gone unnoticed. We used the Hau for independence of regressors to test the hypothesis that and concentration measures were exogenous. We found n that either the concentration ratio or the price-cost mar this data set and feel confident that Ordinary Least Squa unbiased estimates of this model.
Úl. Conclusions
Our results support much of the previous research findings but also add in important ways. First, we challenge the finding that concentration exhibits its maximum effect on the industry's advertising-to-sales ratio at four-firm concentration value as low as 45, especially given that a four-firm concentration ratio of 40 is often the benchmark of workable competition. Our nonlinear relationship between concentration and advertising-to-sales shows the relationship is positive after reachin CR4s of 40 and continues to increase positively even at CR4 values in the 90s. In addition, the HI had a positive significant effect on advertising intensity.
Our findings give the first empirical support that the similarity of market shares among leading firms is a useful supplement to traditional measures of concentration.
The results suggest that as a dominant firm emerges in a market without close rivals it can relax advertising expenditures toward the industry's optimal advertising-tosales ratio as defined by Dorfman and Steiner (1954) . Overinvestment in advertising becomes unnecessary. Market leaders in oligopolies with close rivals, on the other hand, have many incentives to use advertising as a form of rivalry, which perpetuate overinvestment. Evidently, oligopolists either find it advantageous to compete vi advertising or difficult to hold such rivalries in check when they have similar market shares and each is vying for an advantage. The highest advertising intensities are found in concentrated markets that have high price-cost margins and where the leading rivals have similar market shares. Although these results were found in a sample of food and tobacco processing markets, we expect they would hold for an manufacturing markets selling differentiated products to final consumers.
